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NOTES
EVIDENCE--ADmISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT PRECAUTIONS FOR
IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS CALLED UNDER CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,
SECTION 2055.
The value of a long standing rule of evidence may have been put in jeopardy
by the California Supreme Court in Daggett v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co.' For
many years in forty-seven states, including California, evidence of repairs, altera-
tions, or other precautions taken after an accident has been held inadmissible
either as proof of antecedent negligence or as an admission of negligence.3 Early
cases in several states including California4 held to the contrary, but these cases
have been overruled by later ones in all jurisdictions except Kansas. 5
The reason for this rule is primarily the "very urgent policy against discour-
aging taking of safety measures." 6 Mr. Wigmore states that the evidence should
be excluded because the inference of negligence from the act of taking subsequent
precautions is not warranted. He points out that injuries result not only from
negligence but also from accidents and contributory negligence. But he continues
that although it is argued on the general theory of relevancy that such evidence
is admissible, a policy argument strengthens the case for exclusion.
"That argument is that the admission of such acts, even though theoretically not
plainly improper, would be liable to over-emphasis by the jury, and that it would
discourage all owners, even those who had genuinely been careful, from improving the
place or thing that had caused the injury, because they would fear the evidential use
of such acts to their disadvantage; and thus not only would careful owners refrain
from improvements, but even careless ones, who might have deserved to have the
evidence adduced against them, would by refraining from improvements subject
innocent persons to the risk of the recurrence of the injury."7
Evidence of subsequent precautions, however, has been held admissible in
the past for other purposes, such as impeachment of witnesses produced by the
defendant. 8 It is obvious that to the extent the evidence is admitted for any pur-
pose such admission is likely to defeat the policy of encouraging remedial meas-
ures. Therefore, the admission of such evidence should be very restricted and
should be limited to cases where the need for its admission outweighs the advan-
tages to be gained from its exclusion. The holding of the Daggett case, however,
may have opened wide the door to the unrestrained admission of such evidence by
way of impeachment of an adverse party called under Code of Civil Procedure,
section 2055.
The facts of the Daggett case are as follows. Mrs. Daggett and her two minor
children were killed as a result of a collision between defendant's train and the
1 48 Cal. 2d 655, 313 P.2d 557 (1957). See also Hercules Powder Co. v. Automatic Sprinkler
Corp., 151 Cal. App 2d 387, 311 P.2d 907 (1957).
2 Sappenfield v. Main St. & A.P. Ry., 91 Cal. 48, 27 Pac. 590 (1891) ; see note, 170 A.L.R. 7
(1947).
3 Meyer v. San Francisco, 9 Cal. App. 2d 361, 49 P.2d 893 (1935); see note, 170 A.L.R.
7, supra.
4 Butcher v. Vaca Valley, 67 Cal. 518, 8 Pac. 174 (1885).
5 See Note, 170 A.L.R. 7, supra.
6 McCoPsicx, Ev-mscE § 252 (1954).
7 2 WiGmORE, EViDENcE § 283 (3d ed. 1940).
8 Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 5 Cal. 2d 525, 55 P.2d 850 (1936).
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automobile Mrs. Daggett was driving. The surviving husband brought an action
for damages for their deaths. The motorman and a signal engineer employed by
defendant were both called as witnesses for the husband under Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, section 2055.9 The motorman testified that the speed limit set by defendant
in the district in which the accident occurred was 90 miles per hour at the time
of the accident and at the time of the trial. The signal engineer testified that the
wigwag signal in place at the time of the accident was the safest type of automatic
warning device. To impeach the testimony of the motorman, plaintiff was allowed
to show that the speed limit in the district at the particular crossing where the
accident occurred was at the time of the trial 50, not 90, miles per hour. He was
also allowed to impeach the engineer's testimony by showing that by reason of a
request of the California Public Utilities Commission the wigwag signal in place
at the time of the accident had been replaced with a flashing red light.
The court in holding that no error was committed by admitting this evidence
of subsequent changes in the speed limit and signals reasoned in the following
manner. Although evidence of subsequent precautions is not admissible to show
a negligent condition at the time of the accident,10 such evidence has been held
admissible to impeach the testimony of a witness produced by the other party to
the action." In answer to defendant's argument that such evidence is permissible
only to impeach evidence produced by the other party to the action and not to
impeach original evidence produced by the plaintiffs, the court replied that a wit-
ness called under section 2055 is not a witness of the party calling him'2 and may
be impeached. 13 Mr. Wigmore was quoted to the effect that:
"If there is any situation in which any semblance of reason disappears for the appli-
cation of the rule against impeaching one's own witness, it is when the opposing
party is himself called by the first party, and is sought to be compelled to disclose
under oath that truth which he knows but is naturally unwilling to make known." 14
The Supreme Court continued that the extent to which cross examination of
a witness may be carried rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and
the same rule applies to examination of a witness under section 2055.1 The court
concluded that there is no sound reason why evidence of subsequent precautions,
since admissible for impeachment purposes generally, should not also be admissible
for impeachment of a witness called under section 2055.
From a quotation from the transcript in the dissenting opinion it would appear
9 CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PRocEDuR § 2055. "A party to the record of any civil action or
proceeding... may be examined by the adverse party as if under cross-examination, subject
to the rules applicable to the examination of other witnesses. The party calling such adverse
witness shall not be bound by his testimony, and the testimony given by such witness may
be rebutted by the party calling him."
1048 Cal. 2d at 660-661, 313 P.2d at 560-561 citing Helling v. Schindler, 145 Cal. 303,
78 Pac. 710 (1904).
1148 Cal. 2d at 661, 313 P.2d at 561 citing Inyo Chemical Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
6 Cal. 2d 525, 55 P.2d 850 (1930).
12 1d. at 662, 313 P.2d at 561-562, citing Smellie v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540,
299 Pac. 529 (1931).
13 Id. at 664, 313 P.2d at 563, citing Batchelor v. Caslavka, 128 Cal. App. 2d 819, 276 P.2d
64(1954).
14Id. at 662, 313 P.2d at 561 (1957), quoting 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE § 916, p. 431 (3d ed.
1940).
15 Id. at 663, 313 P.2d at 562, citing Paul v. Key System, 80 Cal. App. 2d 21, 180 P.2d 940
(1947).
NOTES
the motorman's testimony as to the present speed limit was a non-responsive
answer.16 But the case does not disclose the precise manner in which the engineer's
testimony that was impeached was given-whether as a direct answer to defense
counsel's question or as information volunteered by the witness. The opinion merely
states that the engineer was the second witness called by the plaintiff as an ad-
verse party under section 2055 and while so testifying gave the testimony which
was impeached.
The opinion notes in passing that the statements of both witnesses "could be
considered as having been volunteered by the witnesses prior to the impeaching
questions asked by plaintiff's counsel." 17 The court, however, does not appear to
base its holding on this uncertain observation. If the holding of the case permit-
ting impeachment by evidence of subsequent precautions of witnesses called under
section 2055 is limited to impeachment of testimony actually volunteered by such
witnesses, there still would be adequate means of keeping out such evidence, as
witnesses could be cautioned against volunteering information.
But the holding of the case may be given the broader interpretation that since
evidence of subsequent precautions is admissible to impeach witnesses produced
by the other party to the action, it is likewise admissible to impeach a party's own
witnesses who are called under section 2055. There is a substantial difference,
however, between permitting such impeachment of the opponent's witnesses and
of a party's own witnesses testifying under section 2055. In the former, the oppo-
nent can so restrict his direct examination of his witnesses that the opportunity to
impeach by evidence of subsequent precautions does not arise. The opponent must
in such a case not only refrain from inquiring as to present conditions, but also
refrain from introducing expert opinion that might be impeached by evidence of
subsequent precautions.
Where the opponent has asked his witness on direct examination his opinion
of the adequacy of precautions previously taken, it would be unfair to the other
party to refuse to permit him to impeach that testimony by evidence of subsequent
precautions. Or when the opponent himself once opens up the question of subse-
quent conditions he should not be allowed to object to a full disclosure of those
conditions, including any precautions taken.
Allowance of impeachment by evidence of subsequent precautions of a party's
own witness called under section 2055 leaves inadequate means of keeping out
such evidence. The rule against the admission of such evidence could be nullified
by the simple device of calling an adverse party under section 2055, asking his
opinion of the safety of the appliance or condition at the time of the accident,
and on the reply that the appliance or condition was safe, impeaching by evidence
of subsequent precautions. A party thus could invite the testimony and then
introduce highly prejudicial evidence in the guise of impeachment of the testimony
which would not be in the case except for the party's own inducement.
Objection to a question as to the safety of a signal or method or appliance
might be sustained in some cases on the ground that the answer sought is an
opinion. 18 As a general rule an expert cannot be questioned as to safety of a
street, appliance, or piece of machinery, nor whether certain methods were prudent
16 1d. at 669, 313 P.2d at 566.
17 Id. at 665, 313 P.2d at 563.
18 Supra note 2.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL (Vol. 9
